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INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 2008, Somali pirates captured the Sirius Star, a
Saudi Arabia-owned oil tanker carrying more than $100 million of
crude oil, off the coast of Kenya.1 Long considered a historical relic,
1. See Robert F. Worth, Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker Off Kenya, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov.
18,
2008,
at
A6
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/11/18/world/africa/18pirates.html?scp=3&sq=piratesandsaudioiltanker&st=c
se (stressing that the Sirius Star is the largest ship pirates have seized to date); see
also Saudi tanker ‘freed off Somalia’, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7820311.stm (last visited Nov. 14, 2009)
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pirates regained the world’s interest with an increasing number of
brazen attacks in the latter half of 2008.2 Most notably, the
International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”) reports an alarming increase
in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.3
Not remotely related to the stereotypical images of eye patches,
parrots, and swords, modern-day pirates have evolved into highly
organized groups of individuals capable of quickly seizing some of
the largest ships available.4 Ransom money is the primary motivation
for the hijackings, and the pirates claim to have no desire to harm the
ship or crew members.5
International law, however, has not adapted to address modern-day
piracy.6 This inadequacy led at least one country to set captured

(reporting that the Sirius Star was released in exchange for a $3 million ransom).
2. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Pirates Capture Tanks and Unwanted
Global Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/africa/27pirates.html?scp=1&sq=soma
liapiratescapturetanksandglobalnotice&st=cse (highlighting that in September
2008 major countries reacted when pirates captured a Ukrainian ship carrying $30
million in weapons). This ship’s capture prompted the United States and Russia to
send their Navies in pursuit of the hijacked ship. Id.
3. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS, REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY – 30 SEPTEMBER 2008, at 32 (2008)
[hereinafter IMB REPORT] (establishing the International Maritime Bureau
(“IMB”) as a division of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and a
non-profit organization designed to be the central point for combating all maritime
crime).
4. See Roger Middleton, Briefing Paper, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening
global trade, feeding local wars, Chatham House Africa Programme Paper 08/02,
2008, at 4-6 (2008) available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203
_1008piracysomalia.pdf (describing how pirates use GPS systems, satellite phones,
and “mother ships” to be more effective and expand the range in which they can
operate, and how a ship can be captured in only fifteen minutes); see also
Gettleman, supra note 2 (explaining how Somali pirates have evolved into an
organized crime ring, with over one thousand gunmen at their disposal, capable of
“grabbing everything from sailing yachts to oil tankers”).
5. See generally Robyn Hunter, How do you pay a pirate’s ransom?, BBC
NEWS, Dec. 3, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 7752813.stm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009) (estimating that the total amount of ransoms paid in 2008 was
around $150 million); Saudi tanker ‘freed off Somalia’, supra note 1 (quoting a
pirate named Daybad that the pirates did not intend to hurt the crew aboard the
Sirius Star).
6. See discussion infra Part II.A-B (arguing that current international
conventions are ineffective for defining and prosecuting pirates).
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pirates free.7 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”) provides the universally-accepted definition of piracy
under international law.8 This definition was drafted for the 1958
Convention on the High Seas, incorporated into the UNCLOS in
1982, and has remained largely unchanged.9 Piratical acts also fall
under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”), even
though the Convention’s main purpose is combating terrorism.10
The international community has reacted in numerous ways to the
increase in piracy.11 However, many of the current actions are not
legal solutions to piracy, but rather measures to provide more
security to the high-risk areas.12 In response to the perceived need for
increased security, American private security companies have
expressed a strong desire to provide a range of security services to
the shipping industry.13 Controversy surrounds the use of these
companies providing armed guards aboard vessels because the legal

7. See Marcus Hand, Danish Navy Releases 10 Somali Pirates, LLOYD'S LIST,
Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.lloydslist.com/
ll/news/danish-navy-releases-10-somali-pirates/20017574257.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009) (reporting that the Danish navy freed ten suspected Somali pirates
because the captured pirates could not be tried in Denmark). Danish authorities
were unwilling to turn them over to the transitional government in Somalia. Id.
8. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (listing acts that count as piracy
under international law); see also S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16,
2008) (reaffirming that the UNCLOS is the appropriate legal framework for
piracy).
9. See BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 4
(1980) (arguing that the law of the sea is “not a static subject” and questioning the
legal view that the piracy articles do not need revision).
10. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter SUA
Convention] (expressing deep concern over the increasing instances of terrorist
attacks on the high seas and outlining a number of terrorist actions punishable
under the Convention).
11. See discussion infra Part I.A (assessing the collaborative efforts of
numerous countries).
12. See id. (describing actions taken by various organizations like the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the U.N. Security Council).
13. See discussion infra Part I.D (discussing two American private security
companies’ interest in protecting vessels from pirates).
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implications are unclear if a private armed guard shoots and kills
another person.14
Part I of this Comment reviews recent actions taken by different
countries and international organizations to combat the increase in
piracy, explores the legal history of piracy, and provides different
international piracy definitions.15 In addition, Part I examines the
increased interest of American private security companies in
protecting the shipping industry and the legal implications of their
involvement.16 Part II argues that the UNCLOS and the SUA
Convention do not effectively define piracy and are insufficient to
prosecute the Somali pirates.17 Part II also argues that American
private security companies can legally provide armed guards aboard
ships.18 Part III proposes methods to ensure that there is an effective
international legal regime that properly defines and prosecutes
pirates.19 Finally, Part III recommends that, though legal for
American companies, the international community should not allow
private security companies to provide armed guards aboard vessels.20

I. BACKGROUND
According to the IMB, the significant increase in reported pirate
attacks is directly related to the increased attacks by Somali pirates
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.21 Some shipping

14. See id. (contrasting the International Maritime Organization’s (“IMO”)
view of armed guards with those of different private security companies).
15. See discussion infra Part I.A–C (explaining how countries have increased
security to the area, how pirates have always been considered “enemies of all
mankind,” and laying out the international legal framework for piracy).
16. See discussion infra Part I.D (evaluating proposals by American private
security companies).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A-B (analyzing the problems with the current
international legal definitions and jurisdiction restrictions of piracy).
18. See discussion infra Part II.C (noting that, although their services are
lawful, these companies expose themselves to many different jurisdictions when
navigating the world’s waters).
19. See discussion infra Part III.A-B (embracing a broader definition of piracy
and a new international court with specific jurisdiction over suspected pirates).
20. See discussion infra Part III.C (suggesting that private security companies
not be allowed to provide armed guards on vessels).
21. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 (observing the increase to eightythree overall pirate attacks in the third quarter of 2008 from fifty-three in the first
quarter and sixty-three in the second quarter). Of the numerous attacks during
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companies have decided to stop using the Gulf of Aden altogether
and instead take a considerably longer route around the African
continent.22 Though some Somali pirates attain local hero status in
their communities,23 piracy is still a crime and the international
community must address it effectively.24 Both the UNCLOS and the
SUA Convention contain articles that cover piratical acts.25 In
addition, American private security companies have responded by
offering security services to the shipping industry.26

A. COMMON ELEMENTS OF RECENT PIRATE ATTACKS AND
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
The recent pirate attacks occur either within Somalia’s territorial
seas or when the pirates capture a ship on the high seas and then
retreat into Somalia’s territorial sea.27 Somalia is a prime location for
2008, sixty-three took place off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Id.
These Somali pirates managed to hijack twenty-six vessels, hold 537 crew
members hostage, and fire upon an additional twenty-one vessels in the first nine
months of 2008. Id.
22. See Michael Buchanan, Pirates Threaten Christmas Shopping, BBC NEWS,
Oct. 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7686466.s tm (last visited Nov. 14,
2009) (indicating that sailing around the Cape of Good Hope can add up to three
weeks to a ship’s route). According to insurance companies, if ships choose to
continue to sail through the waters off the coast of Somalia, then insurance
premiums are likely to rise and this cost will likely be passed on to the consumer.
Id. See also John W. Miller, Piracy Spurs Threats to Shipping Costs, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 19, 2008, at A12, available at http://online.wsj.com/articl e/SB12270186474
3437147.html (reporting that companies whose ships opt for the longer but safer
route, which costs far more in fuel to complete, are trying to pressure governments
along the Gulf of Aden to crack down on piracy or face lost revenues from ships
that pass through the area).
23. See Pirates are Not Swashbucklers: They’re Thieves, NAT’L NEWSPAPER,
Nov. 19, 2008, available at http://www.thenational.ae/article/20081119/OPINIO
N/113627547/1119 (quoting a wedding guest at a pirate’s wedding as saying that
“[m]arrying a pirate is every Somali girl’s dream . . . [because] [h]e has power,
money, immunity and the weapons to defend the tribe.”).
24. See George D. Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as
an International Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1434
(2007) (opining that the romanticization of piracy detracts from the fact that it “has
become a real problem”).
25. See discussion infra Part I.C.1-2 (introducing the relevant articles under the
UNCLOS and the SUA Convention).
26. See discussion infra Part I.D (detailing recent proposals by American
private security companies).
27. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (summarizing numerous attacks
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piracy because it has no functioning government,28 no effective
coastal security, and a high poverty rate.29 The lack of coastal
security is even more exasperated by the length of the coastline,
which is 3025 kilometers.30 Most ship owners succumb to the
pirates’ demands and pay the ransoms of hijacked ships.31 Ship
owners believe it is better to pay the ransom than to risk losing crew
members and equipment.32
The international community has made a concerted effort to
respond to the pirate attacks.33 The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (“NATO”) launched Operation Allied Provider in order
to provide more security to the area.34 The U.N. Security Council
passed numerous temporary resolutions.35 The most current
where the pirates sailed the stolen ship back to Somalia’s coastal seas, anchored it,
and then demanded a ransom to release the ship and its crew members).
28. See Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and
Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1,
18 (2007) (noting that Somalia has not had a “functioning government, no real
laws, and no enforcement power” since 1991).
29. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 8 (recognizing that the Transitional Federal
Government (“TFG”) of Somalia does not have the ability to capture pirates or
secure its territorial seas); see also Ethan C. Stiles, Note, Reforming Current
International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 299, 301 (2004) (asserting that pirates frequently target locations with
ineffective water patrols, prevalent crime, and poor economic conditions). These
“hotspots” include the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia and South Africa. Id.
30. See CIA World Factbook, Africa: Somalia, available at https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2010).
31. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 6 (hypothesizing that paying ransoms
makes the situation worse but noting the lack of alternatives companies face when
outside help is unavailable).
32. Id.
33. See S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008) (welcoming
initiatives by numerous countries, including the United States, Russia, India, and
the United Kingdom, and praising NATO and the European Union for providing
naval operations).
34. See News Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Naval Task
Group En Route to Escort Duties off Somali Coast (Oct. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/allied_provider/news_release/NR_0
1_08.html (explaining that Operation Allied Provider was primarily created to
escort World Food Programme ships taking aid to Somalia but will also be used to
create a deterrent presence in the area).
35. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008)
(condemning all acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia); S.C. Res. 1816, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008) (grappling with maritime security concerns and
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resolution extends the authority of cooperating states to enter and
capture pirates in areas normally considered Somalia’s sovereign
territory.36
In addition, the United States has agreed to turn captured pirates
over to Kenya for detention and prosecution.37 These types of
agreements are currently necessary “because no country, including
the U.S., has been willing to hold the [captured] pirates.”38 Similar
agreements exist between other countries; however, there is no
uniformity among the various agreements due to different political
climates and practical issues.39 Another international collaboration
that coordinates anti-piracy actions is the Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia.40 The Contact Group’s main goal is to
“examine practical options for strengthening the ability of countries
willing to detain and prosecute suspected pirates.”41
providing suggestions to the international community about how to address piracy
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden).
36. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, ¶ 10 (authorizing the states to treat
Somalia’s territorial seas as high seas for the purpose of combating piracy). This
resolution expired on December 2, 2009. Id.
37. See Richard Meade, U.S. to Sign Kenya Deal to Prosecute Somali Pirates,
LLOYD’S
LIST,
Jan.
16,
2009,
http://www.lloydslist.com/
ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=20017609027 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009)
(observing that the use of bilateral agreements is becoming increasingly more
common between countries that have committed ships to combat piracy in the Gulf
of Aden and countries that are willing to accept captured pirates); see also, David
Morgan, U.S. Delivers Seven Somali Pirate Suspects to Kenya, REUTERS, Mar. 5,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52480N20090305.
38. Morgan, supra note 37. But see U.S. Navy Arrests Pirate Suspects in Gulf
of Aden, CNN.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/02/
11/piracy.arrests/
index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (detailing the first pirate arrests made by
the U.S.). The pirates will be prosecuted in Kenya. Id.
39. See Meade, supra note 36 (reporting that pirates caught by the United
Kingdom were being prosecuted through the Kenyan legal system and it is
understood that pirates caught by Indian forces were handed over to Yemen
officials). See also UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (specifying that the courts of
the state that seizes pirates outside the jurisdiction of another state may decide
what to do with the captured pirates).
40. See David Osler, Piracy Contact Group Launched, LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 15,
2009, http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm ?articleId=20017608173
&src=rss (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (stating that this group consists of twentyfour countries, including the United States, and five international organizations).
41. See id. (reporting that the Contact Group’s first meeting on January 14,
2009, also created separate teams focused on providing support to anti-piracy
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B. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF PIRACY
Piracy has existed since antiquity.42 Unlike most crimes, piracy
conjures up wild fantasies and adventures in the minds of many
people, especially those who grew up in Western culture.43 The
historically accepted theory in Europe is that pirates are hostis
humani generis, meaning “enemies of all mankind.”44 The U.S.
Supreme Court accepted this theory and in 1820 opined that because
pirates were hostis humani generis they were subject to prosecution
by all nations.45 A necessary implication of designating pirates as
hostis humani generis is that they are subject to universal
jurisdiction.46 Universal jurisdiction means that any state can assert
jurisdiction over the defendant even though the act did not occur in
that state’s territorial jurisdiction.47

C. INTERNATIONAL PIRACY DEFINITIONS
Article 101 of the UNCLOS is the generally-accepted international
legal definition of piracy.48 However, other conventions and

operations and tracking pirates’ financial resources).
42. See Jason Power, Comment, Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for
National and International Security, 10 BARRY L. REV. 111, 112 (2008) (tracing
the act of piracy to 1190 B.C.).
43. See STEFAN EKLÖF, PIRATES IN PARADISE: A MODERN HISTORY OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S MARITIME MARAUDERS 1 (2006) (referring to many books and
movies that depict real and fictional pirates as “brave, adventurous, cruel,
bloodthirsty and hungry for gold and treasures”).
44. See id. at 7-8 (clarifying that while this theory was generally accepted,
many European countries used state sanctioned piracy as a war tactic that
continued in times of peace).
45. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 152 (1820) (“[Piracy] is
punishable in the Courts of the United States . . . [and pirates] are proper objects
for the penal code of all nations.”); see also United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel,
43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844) (A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani
generis).
46. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 11 (observing that piracy is the oldest offense
that falls under universal jurisdiction).
47. See Power, supra note 42, at 125–26 (elaborating that once a state exercises
universal jurisdiction over a pirate it then uses its own national laws to prosecute
the pirate).
48. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33 (reaffirming that the UNCLOS is the
appropriate legal framework for piracy). See generally DUBNER, supra note 9
(providing an overview of the international law applicable to international piracy
and proposing some suggestions for combating piracy in the 21st century).
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organizations have also attempted to expand the definition of piracy
by creating their own definitions.49 The SUA Convention does not
specifically denominate any offenses as piracy, but it covers piratical
acts under a broader class of illegal offenses against ships.50
Furthermore, the IMB has created its own definition in order to
accurately track the number of pirate attacks that occur each year.51
1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Article 101 states that piracy is an “illegal act of violence or
detention” that is “committed for private ends” and is directed
against another ship on the “high seas.”52 Even though not all
countries have ratified the UNCLOS, notably the United States,53 the
Article 101 piracy definition is generally accepted as binding
customary international law on all nations.54 A major component of
the UNCLOS definition of piracy is that the act must take place on
the high seas.55 No state has sovereignty over any part of the high
seas, however universal jurisdiction is implicit in the UNCLOS
under Article 105.56 Thus states will have jurisdiction over pirates if
they are captured on the high seas. In contrast, territorial seas are
49. See discussion infra Part I.C.2-3 (distinguishing other definitions of piracy
from the UNCLOS definition).
50. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (making it illegal to take over
control of another ship by force, threat, or any form of intimidation).
51. IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
52. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101.
53. See MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE U.N. LAW
OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE
OCTOBER 2003 2 (Oct. 31, 2007) (explaining that when the UNCLOS was first
opened for signature the United States did not agree with the deep seabed
provisions concerning “resources beyond national jurisdiction”). Acceptable
changes were made, and in October 2007 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
voted to recommend that the Senate ratify the Convention. Id. at 1. However, the
treaty never came before the full Senate for a vote that session. Id. at 2.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987) (stating that customary international law results when states
act out of a sense of legal obligation to consistently follow a certain practice).
55. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 86 (excluding from the definition of piracy
acts that take place in the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), the territorial seas, a
state’s internal waters, or archipelagic waters).
56. See id. art. 105 (permitting all states to seize pirates’ ships and arrest the
people on board if the ship is in “the high seas” or “outside the jurisdiction of any
State”). Article 105 also explicitly states that the state may determine the penalties
to be imposed. Id.
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waters up to twelve nautical miles off the coastal State, and a state
has complete sovereignty over its territorial seas.57 Ships are subject
to the laws of every state through whose territorial seas they travel
and to the law of the state whose flag they are flying.58
2. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation
The SUA Convention also covers piratical acts.59 The United
States ratified this treaty in 1995, but Somalia is not a party to the
SUA Convention.60 The SUA Convention was proposed as a result of
the politically-motivated hijacking of the Achille Lauro, an Italian
cruise ship.61 Article 3 of the SUA Convention prohibits a person
from taking a ship by force, harming a person on board a ship, and
destroying or damaging ships.62
Unlike the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention does not have a high
seas requirement.63 In addition, the SUA Convention does not apply
to ships that operate solely in the territorial seas of a coastal state.64
The SUA Convention is also distinct from the UNCLOS because it

57. See id. art. 2-5 (detailing that the baseline for measuring territorial seas is
the “low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts”).
58. See id. art. 3 (establishing the coastal state’s jurisdiction over its territorial
sea); see also id. art. 92 (explaining that ships can only sail under one flag and are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that flag state while on the high seas). A
ship may not change its flag during a trip, and there are consequences for ships that
sail under two or more flags of different states. Id.
59. SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
60. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN FORCE FOR
THE UNITED STATES AS OF JANUARY 1, 2007: MARITIME MATTERS 119-20 (2007),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organ ization/89668.pdf (listing the
137 countries that are parties to the SUA Convention).
61. See Power, supra note 42, at 124 (describing the hijacking in which
terrorists demanded that Palestinians held in Israel be released or else they would
kill passengers). The terrorists killed one American. Id.
62. SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
63. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 86 (applying the piracy articles only
to the high seas), with SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 4 (applying the SUA
Convention to all ships that travel “through or from waters beyond the outer limit
of the territorial sea”).
64. See Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea – The Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 337, 348 (2008) (reasoning that the SUA Convention only applies
to ships that leave territorial seas with international travel routes).
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focuses on punishing offenders.65 Therefore, a significant aspect of
the SUA Convention is that it requires a state party to either
prosecute or extradite an offender.66
Unlike the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention does not embrace the
notion of universal jurisdiction. Rather, under the SUA Convention
there are three distinct ways a state party can establish jurisdiction
over an offender in order to prosecute him or her.67 First, a state party
can establish jurisdiction if the illegal act takes place in the state
party’s own territorial seas.68 Second, a state party can establish
jurisdiction if the attack was against or on board a ship flying the flag
of a state party.69 Third, a state party can establish jurisdiction if the
attack is perpetuated by one of its own nationals.70 Similar to the
UNCLOS, a party to the SUA Convention does not have jurisdiction
to venture into the territorial seas of another nation to capture
offenders.71
3. International Maritime Bureau
The IMB uses an alternate definition of piracy.72 Essentially, it
covers all attempts to take a ship regardless of the location.73 The

65. See Carlo Tiribelli, Time to Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 8 OR.
REV. INT’L. L. 133, 135 (2006) (concluding that the SUA Convention aimed to
provide effective judicial remedies against offenders committing illegal acts
against ships); see also Tuerk, supra note 64, at 348-49 (pointing out that even
though the word “suppression” is in the title of the SUA Convention, there is only
one article in the convention that actually addresses the suppression of criminal
acts).
66. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 10 (requiring a state that captures
offenders to “extradite [them]” or send the case “to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution”).
67. See id. art. 6 (limiting the ways a state party can establish jurisdiction over
an offense).
68. Id. art. 6(1)(b).
69. Id. art. 6(1)(a).
70. Id. art. 6(1)(c).
71. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 25 (“[T]here is no right-of-entry into territorial
waters for nations capable of actual suppression.”).
72. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (defining piracy as “[a]n act of
boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft
or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the
furtherance of that act”).
73. See id. (clarifying that the IMB definition applies to ships that are at sea,
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IMB uses a broader definition than the UNCLOS because the
UNCLOS does not include acts of piracy that take place in a state’s
territorial seas.74 The IMB definition also does not make a distinction
between a crime committed for private ends and a crime committed
for public ends.75 The IMB definition has no legal consequences, but
rather deviates from the UNCLOS definition solely “[f]or statistical
purposes”.76

D. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND ARMED GUARDS
On October 16, 2008, Blackwater Worldwide77 announced its
interest in providing security assistance to the shipping industry to
help combat piracy.78 Blackwater proposed to provide an escort ship
to accompany vessels on their routes, rather than having armed
guards on the client’s ship itself.79 Blackwater is no stranger to
controversy and has been criticized for some of its questionable
berthed or anchored).
74. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a)(i) (limiting the piracy definition to
the high seas).
75. Compare id. art. 101(a) (narrowing the definition to crimes committed for
“private ends”), with IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (referring to acts of piracy
without any reference to subjective intent).
76. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that to get accurate
statistics the IMB uses an alternative definition because many attacks take place
within states’ jurisdictions and the UNCLOS definition does not encompass these
attacks).
77. See Dana Hedgpeth, Blackwater Sheds Name, Shifts Focus, WASH. POST,
Feb. 14, 2009, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conten
t/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021303149.html (indicating that Blackwater is
changing its name to “Xe” (pronounced “zee”) because “the idea is to define the
company as what it is today and not what it used to be”).
78. See Press Release, Blackwater Worldwide, Blackwater Worldwide’s
Maritime Operations Ready to Assist Shipping Industry (Oct. 16, 2008), available
at http://blackwatermediacenter.com/images/pdf/10-16-08%20Maritime-Release
.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (citing costs of piracy to the shipping industry as
reasons for additional security). These costs include higher insurance payments,
higher crew pay, and higher ransoms. Id.
79. See id. (describing the 183-foot McArthur ship as a “multi-purpose
maritime vessel designed to support military and law enforcement training,
peacekeeping, and stability operations worldwide.”). But see Sanhita SinhaRoy,
Blackwater to Battle Pirates: The Private Security Firm Eyes a New Market: The
High Seas, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://www.int
hesetimes.com/article/4173/blackwater_to_battle_pirates/ (reporting that as of
January 2009 Blackwater does not have any contracts with the shipping industry
and that the McArthur ship is still in the United States).
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actions in Iraq.80 However, providing support for the shipping
industry is inherently different from providing services in Iraq
because Blackwater would not be under contract with the U.S. State
Department.81 HollowPoint Protective Services, another American
private security company interested in providing security services in
the Gulf of Aden, has clearly stated its view that armed guards are
the answer.82 To bypass the current criticism over the use of private
security companies in Iraq, the CEO of HollowPoint distinguished
protection of the shipping industry from those services provided by
Blackwater in Iraq.83
Private security companies providing services to the shipping
industry are not a new phenomenon.84 For years, private security

80. See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber, Contractors Charged in ’07 Iraq Deaths,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at A2, available at http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2008/12/08/AR2008120
800486_pf.html (indicating that Blackwater Worldwide is a North Carolina-based
security firm that has contracts to operate in Iraq, and detailing the indictment of
six Blackwater security guards who were charged in December 2008 with
voluntary manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, and firearm violations in the
shooting deaths of at least fourteen Iraqi civilians). But see, Charlie Savage, Judge
Drops Charges From Blackwater Deaths in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01blackwater.html (quoting a
federal judge’s opinion that the “mishandling of the case requires dismissal of the
indictment against all the defendants”).
81. See Elise Labott, Official: U.S. Will Not Renew Iraq Contract with
Blackwater, CNN.COM, Jan. 30, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast
/01/30/us.blackwater.contract/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (reporting that
Blackwater is losing its contract with the State Department because the Iraqi
government refused to renew the company’s license). Blackwater will continue to
have contracts with the State Department for overseas protection of diplomats. Id.
82. See Press Release, HollowPoint Protective Services, “Ships Need Armed
Guards,” Says Security Firm Chief (Oct. 20, 2008) available at
http://hollowpointprotection.com/media/HPPSPiracyPressRelease.pdf (challenging
the “widespread opposition to the practice” and claiming that HollowPoint is
currently in negotiations to provide armed protection to shipping companies).
83. See id. (“Our purpose is singular in nature. We provide protection for
vessels, their crews and cargo. Unlike the situation in Iraq where Blackwater is
involved in both peacekeeping and protection activities, we only respond to attacks
on the vessels we protect.”).
84. See Katharine Houreld, After Iraq, Security Firms Join Somalia Piracy
Fight, ABC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Internationa
l/wireStory?id=6114582 (asserting that British security companies already have a
majority of the market in the Gulf of Aden but that American companies are
increasingly interested in providing their own services).
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companies have provided services ranging from consulting on
preventative measures to post-attack services.85 In addition, insurance
companies are now providing discounted rates to ships that hire their
own security.86 However, the use of armed guards varies from
company to company.87
The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) strongly
discourages the use of firearms to protect vessels and crews.88 The
IMO believes that pirates may be more tempted to carry weapons if
they believe that ships are armed, thus “escalating an already
dangerous situation.”89 With or without firearms, private security
companies wishing to provide security to the shipping industry are
subject to every jurisdiction through which they sail, and the state
whose flag they sail under.90

85. See Carolin Liss, Private Security Companies in the Fight Against Piracy
in Asia 3 (Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 120, 2005) (discussing a
range of private security services that include risk assessment, crew training, and
recovery of hijacked vessels and crew rescue).
86. See Houreld, supra note 84 (announcing that Hart, a British security firm,
has entered into an agreement with an insurance company where the insurance
company offers discounted rates for ships that use Hart guards). There is no
mention of whether these guards will be armed. Id.
87. See id. (declaring that the British security firm Eos does not arm its
employees and that its director believes this restriction attracts customers to the
firm).
88. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on
Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, ¶¶
60-61, MSC.1/Circ.1334 (June 23, 2009) [hereinafter IMO Guidelines] (reasoning
that weapons use requires special training and that accidental killings can
potentially have unforeseen consequences, legal and otherwise, even if the person
believes it was self-defense); see also EKLÖF, supra note 43, at 128 (emphasizing
that there are numerous other ways to fight off pirates such as using fire hoses and
barbed wire).
89. IMO Guidelines¸ supra note 88, at ¶ 60. But see Press Release,
HollowPoint Protective Services, supra note 82 (alleging that pirates know which
ships are likely to have armed guards and they take this into account when
targeting ships).
90. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing state laws ships are
subject to under the UNCLOS); see also Liss, supra note 85, at 6 (recognizing that
abiding by the laws of multiple jurisdictions can be a “difficult and complex task”).
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II. ANALYSIS
Under the UNCLOS, some of the Somali pirate attacks are not
piracy because they do not occur on the high seas.91 States can
exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates for acts that occur on the
high seas only if the pirates are captured on the high seas.92 Under
the SUA Convention, piracy is illegal, but jurisdiction restrictions
make prosecution unlikely.93

A. SOME SOMALI PIRATES FAIL TO MEET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE UNCLOS PIRACY DEFINITION
An offense is piracy under the UNCLOS if it is committed for
private ends, it occurs between two separate ships, and it takes place
on the high seas.94 Some Somali pirate attacks meet the first two
requirements but fail to meet the high seas requirement.95 Failure to
meet the high seas requirement means the acts are not piracy under
international law. Some Somali pirate attacks meet all three
requirements, but states cannot exercise universal jurisdiction to
prosecute the pirates unless the pirates are seized on the high seas.96
Typically, however, the Somali pirates evade capture on high seas by
retreating to Somalia’s territorial seas.
1. Somali Pirates Meet the “Private Ends” Requirement and the
“Two-Ship” Requirement
Article 101(a) states that “private ends” must motivate the illegal
act and a person on a private ship must commit the act.97 A major
91. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101 (limiting the definition of piracy to the
high seas); see also Bahar, supra note 28, at 17 (concluding that harmed states
must utilize other mechanisms if the act takes place in territorial seas).
92. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
93. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 10 (dictating what a signatory
state should do if it apprehends an offender); see also Tiribelli, supra note 65, at
149 (arguing that a “fundamental defect” of the SUA Convention is that it does not
actually have a “strict obligation to extradite”).
94. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a).
95. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 (reporting twelve attacks in Somalia’s
territorial seas).
96. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (limiting the seizure of ships to the
high seas); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (observing that the
Somali pirates are anchoring the stolen ships in Somalia’s territorial seas).
97. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a).
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exception to the UNCLOS definition of piracy is that politically
motivated acts do not meet the “private ends” requirement and are
therefore not piracy.98 For example, the hijacking of the Achille
Lauro was not piracy because it was politically motivated.99 In
contrast, the Somali pirates operate for large amounts of ransom
money and not for any political reason.100 Ransoms are paid in cash
and the Somali pirates take this cash for their personal gain.101
In addition to the “private ends” requirement, the act must involve
two ships to qualify as piracy.102 Article 101 of the UNCLOS
specifically states that the acts must be “against another ship or
aircraft.”103 The Somali pirates meet this requirement because they
are approaching the targeted ships in separate ships.104 The “twoship” requirement is always going to be met unless the Somali
pirates start acting as stowaways or pose as crew members.105 It is
highly unlikely that Somali pirates will change their current strategy
because they have already created an effective system where they use

98. See JACK A. GOTTSCHALK & BRIAN P. FLANAGAN, JOLLY ROGER WITH AN
UZI: THE RISE AND THREAT OF MODERN PIRACY 35 (2000) (concluding that the act
does not have to be “sanctioned by a recognized government” to be considered
political).
99. See id. at 36-37 (using the politically-motivated Achille Lauro incident as
an example to illustrate the problems with defining piracy as an act of private
motivation under the UNCLOS). Both a federal judge and the President of the
United States cited that incident as piracy even though technically it was not
legally correct. Id. at 37.
100. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 51–65 (narrating the details of each
reported pirate attack and concluding that the trend appears to be that pirates are
operating purely for ransom money).
101. See Posting of Jeffrey Gettleman to The Ledge, The New York Times
News Blog, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/q-a-with-a-pirate-wejust-want-the-money/?ref=africa (Sept. 30, 2008, 09:10 EST) (quoting the
spokesperson for the Somali pirates holding a Ukrainian ship hostage at the time of
the interview as saying the ransom money is used to “protect ourselves from
hunger”).
102. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 35 (describing the
hijacking of the Santa Maria, a Portuguese cruise ship, as not piracy because no
second vessel had been used to board the ship).
103. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a)(i).
104. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining how the Somali pirates use
small skiffs to attack larger ships).
105. See Power, supra note 42, at 119 (hypothesizing that the only way to attack
a vessel in international waters is to use another vessel).
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quicker, smaller, and easily maneuverable ships to attack.106
Therefore, the Somali pirates fulfill the “private ends” and the “twoship” requirement.107
2. When Somali Pirates Fail to Meet the High Seas Requirement the
Acts Are not Piracy
The final requirement under the UNCLOS for an act to qualify as
piracy is that pirates must commit the act on the high seas or outside
the jurisdiction of any state.108 The Somali pirates do not meet this
requirement when the attacks occur in the territorial seas of
Somalia.109 When attacks take place in Somalia’s territorial seas, the
acts fail to meet the high seas requirement based purely on
geography.110 However, when the Somali pirates attack ships in the
Gulf of Aden farther than twelve nautical miles off the coast, the act
is piracy under the UNCLOS.111 Thus, twelve miles is the
determinative distance for classifying an attack as piracy.
3. The Inability of States to Capture Pirates on the High Seas
Means States Cannot Exercise Universal Jurisdiction over Them
States only have the authority to seize the pirates on the high seas.112
When the Somali pirates retreat to Somalia’s territorial seas they are
no longer on the high seas and only Somalia has jurisdiction over
them.113 It is estimated that the time between sighting a pirate, and

106. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that the pirates also use
“mother ships” to increase their range, and so many times there are at least three
ships directly or indirectly involved in every attack).
107. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a).
108. See id.
109. See id. art. 101; see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 (acknowledging
at least twelve attacks took place off the coast of Somalia).
110. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 86 (affirming that territorial seas are not
considered part of the high seas).
111. See id. art. 3; see also Encyclopedia Britannica, Gulf of Aden, available at
http://www.britannica.com /EBchecked/topic/5650/Gulf-of-Aden (describing the
total width of the Gulf of Aden as 300 miles).
112. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105.
113. See id. art. 2 (declaring that the coastal state has sovereignty over its
territorial seas); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (indicating that in all
instances where pirates hijacked a ship in the Gulf of Aden, the pirates then took
the ship and crew and anchored off the coast of Somalia).
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the pirate boarding a target ship is fifteen minutes.114 This short time
span makes it extremely difficult for a state to capture pirates on the
high seas before they retreat into Somalia’s territorial seas.115 Since a
naval ship cannot seize the Somali pirates once they retreat into
Somalia’s territorial seas, it is difficult for foreign states to capture
pirates and establish jurisdiction over them.116
One counterargument to the inability to establish jurisdiction over
pirates is that under the UNCLOS framework countries are legally
entitled to enter the territorial seas of Somalia because Somalia does
not actually have any territorial seas.117 The UNCLOS is a treaty
among states and only states can have territorial seas.118 Since
Somalia is a failed state, it is unable to legally claim a territorial
sea.119 Therefore, the argument goes, the waters off the coast of
Somalia are “outside the jurisdiction of any State.”120
On July 24, 1989, the then-current Somalia government
ratified the UNCLOS,121 and affirmatively claimed an extreme

114. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (maintaining that the short amount of
time it takes to seize a ship explains why waters with security patrols are still
ineffective at deterring attacks). It is hypothesized that to actually prevent an attack
a naval vessel would have to be incredibly close to the ship under attack and
helicopters would have to be instantaneously ready to assist. Id.
115. But see id. at 4 (recognizing that a U.S. naval ship was able to prevent a
pirate attack on August 8, 2008, but also acknowledging that the naval ship was
only ten miles away and able to launch helicopters).
116. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 111(3) (prohibiting a state from letting its
ship pursue a second ship into the second ship’s state territorial waters or another
state’s territorial seas).
117. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 67 (arguing that the United States could enter
within twelve nautical miles of Somalia’s coast without legal consequences).
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §201 (1987) (“[A] state is an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages
in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”).
119. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 67 (citing reasons why Somalia is not a state,
including that Somalia does not have a functioning government, that it has
continuously been in a state of civil war, and that in January 2007 it declared a
state of emergency).
120. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a) (limiting the area where piracy acts
can occur).
121. LAW OF THE SEA, BULLETIN NO. 37, at 2 (1998) available at
http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletinE37.pdf.
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territorial sea of two hundred nautical miles.122 However, that legal
entity has ceased to exist. Since 1991 none of the transitional
governments in Somalia have formally declared a territorial sea.123
Under the UNCLOS a state has to affirmatively declare its territorial
sea.124 The UNCLOS does not automatically create a territorial sea
for every coastal State, but rather only authorizes a state to legally
claim a territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles from its coast.125
Regardless of the fact that no Somalia transitional government has
laid claim to a territorial sea, the world recognizes Somalia as a
sovereign entity with jurisdiction over its territorial seas.126
However, following the framework of UNCLOS, Somalia’s
territorial sea is recognized as twelve nautical miles, not two
hundred.127 Thus, for purposes of combating piracy Somalia does
have a territorial sea and the UNCLOS does not reach the Somali
pirates because they are either operating in, or retreating to, Somalia
territorial seas.128

B. SOMALI PIRATES ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL ACTS UNDER THE SUA
CONVENTION, BUT EXTRADITION TO SOMALIA IS IMPOSSIBLE AND
JURISDICTION RESTRICTIONS MAKE PROSECUTION UNLIKELY
Under the SUA Convention, the first determination is whether the
pirates’ actions are an illegal offense.129 If the actions are illegal, the
capturing country either has to prosecute or extradite the suspected

122. Table
of Claims
to
Maritime
Jurisdiction, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_s
ummary_of_claims.pdf.
123. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 68 (concluding that it is strictly a “plain
language” argument to say that Somalia has no right to declare a territorial sea).
124. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 3 (affirming the right of every coastal state
to claim a territorial sea).
125. Id.
126. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33 (“Reaffirming its respect for the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and the unity of
Somalia.”).
127. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 69 (noting that Kenya rejected a motion
arguing lack of jurisdiction based on Somalia’s claim to a two hundred mile
territorial sea).
128. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-20 (detailing how the Somali pirates
either operate in Somalia territorial seas or take captured ships back to them).
129. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (listing illegal offenses under
the convention).
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pirate.130 However, there is no “strict obligation to extradite” the
offender.131 If there is no extradition agreement between the two
countries wishing to extradite a pirate, then the capturing country
“may, at its option,” use the SUA Convention as a basis for
extradition.132
1. Somali Pirates Engage in Illegal Acts Under the SUA Convention
Article 3(1)(a) of the SUA Convention makes it a crime for any
person to use force to seize or take control of a ship.133 The Somali
pirates’ acts fit this definition because they are using force to seize
ships.134 A pirate necessarily has to use force to seize a ship; no
legitimate ship owner is going to willfully turn his or her ship over to
a gang of pirates.135 Furthermore, if pirates believed that force was
not necessary to capture ships they would not arm themselves with a
small arsenal of weapons.136

130. See id. art. 10(1) (commanding the state either to initiate proceedings
against the accused or extradite him or her to a country that will prosecute the
unlawful offense).
131. See Tiribelli, supra note 65, at 149 (arguing that this is a “fundamental
defect” with the agreement).
132. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 11(2) (allowing states that make
“extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty” to use discretion in deciding
whether to extradite under the convention); see also Power, supra note 42, at 12728 (raising the issue that many countries that pirates target do not have extradition
agreements with other countries).
133. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (outlining other illegal offenses
under the convention, such as destroying a ship, harming or killing a crew member,
and endangering the safe navigation of a ship).
134. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 51-53 (providing detailed reports of
pirates using force in attacks off Somalia); see also id. at 14 (recording that the
majority of attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia involved pirates armed with
guns). One narrative states, “[p]irates armed with guns and grenade launchers
attacked the fishing vessel and hijacked it to an unknown location. Twenty-six
crew members were taken hostage and a ransom demanded for their safe release.
On 25 April 2008 the crew and vessel were released by the pirates. It appears the
owners paid a ransom . . . .” Id. at 51-52.
135. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (providing an example of how one
boat went into a high-speed spin until the attackers gave up and contending that
captains take whatever evasive actions they can to prevent pirates from boarding
their ships).
136. See id. (asserting that pirates use automatic weapons and rocket launchers
to assault ships).
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Some Somali pirates might also commit crimes delineated under
Article 3(1)(b) or 3(1)(c) of the SUA Convention.137 Article 3(1)(b)
pertains to individuals who harm a person onboard a ship, and
Article 3(1)(c) covers individuals who destroy or damage ships.138
However, the Somali pirates’ sole motivation is ransom money and
they rarely harm crew members or destroy or damage ships.139 Thus,
Article (3)(1)(a) applies to all Somali pirates, and in some remote
cases other provisions may also apply.140
2. Extradition to Somalia is Impossible and Jurisdiction Restrictions
Make Prosecution by a Capturing State Unlikely
Under the SUA Convention, a capturing country must prosecute or
extradite a person engaging in an illegal act.141 A capturing country
cannot extradite Somali pirates to Somalia unless it has an
extradition agreement with Somalia.142 A capturing country does not
have the option to use the SUA Convention in lieu of an extradition
agreement because Somalia is not a party to the SUA Convention.143

137. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (delineating illegal acts of force
often committed by pirates when seizing or attempting to seize a ship).
138. Id.; see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 29 (detailing how armed pirates
fired at ships in order to hijack them). In addition, one ship Master had a heart
attack and died onboard after pirates successfully hijacked his ship. Id. at 30.
139. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 6 (stating that for the most part crews are
treated well but that there have also been reports of crews being beaten, or not
being given adequate food and water); see also David Osler, Yardimci Mulls
Armed Guards for Ships Transiting Gulf of Aden, LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 13, 2009,
http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=20017607278 (last
visited Nov. 14, 2009) (reporting that the crew of a hijacked ship was safe and in
good health after being held hostage for over two months).
140. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (establishing that an individual
can be prosecuted for seizing a ship, without making injury to passengers a
necessary element of the offense).
141. See id. art. 10 (providing that when a state does not extradite an alleged
offender, it must prosecute him or her “without delay”); see also Power, supra note
42, at 127 (asserting that if the state cannot exercise proper jurisdiction over the
individual engaged in the illegal activity the state must then extradite the individual
to an authority that has proper jurisdiction).
142. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES
LAW AND PRACTICE 25 (Oxford University Press, 2007) (establishing that most
states believe the duty to extradite arises from treaties or national legislation).
143. See Int’l. Mar. Org., http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=91 0 (follow
“Status of Conventions by country” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
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Furthermore, even if extradition were possible, Somalia lacks a
functioning government capable of prosecuting the pirates.144
A capturing state has three options under the SUA Convention to
establish jurisdiction over pirates.145 Still, capturing states will have
difficultly establishing jurisdiction over the Somali pirates, thus
making prosecution unlikely.146 The first jurisdiction option does not
apply because the pirates are not operating in the territorial seas of
any state party; the pirates are operating in Somalia’s territorial seas
or the Gulf of Aden.147 Second, it is unlikely that a state party can
establish jurisdiction over the Somali pirates because the pirates
hijacked a ship sailing under its flag. A majority of the hijacked ships
fly under the flags of Antigua Barbuda, Cyprus, Liberia, the Marshall
Islands, Panama, and Singapore.148 Many of the naval ships in the
area are from the United States, the European Union, Denmark,
Russia, India, and Canada.149 Therefore, a U.S. ship could capture
pirates attacking a Liberian ship, but the United States has no
jurisdiction to prosecute them under the SUA Convention because
the pirates did not attack a U.S. ship. Finally, the third jurisdiction
option does not apply because the pirates are from Somalia; they are
not nationals from any state party.150 Therefore, it is unlikely that a
capturing state could establish jurisdiction to prosecute the pirates
under the SUA Convention.151

144. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at 1 (recognizing Somalia’s inability to
effectively combat piracy).
145. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the ways a nation can establish
jurisdiction under the SUA Convention).
146. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 6(4) (mandating that a capturing
country take the necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over applicable
offenses).
147. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 (stating that there were twelve attacks
off Somalia and fifty-one in the Gulf of Aden during the first three quarters of
2008).
148. See id. at 17-18 (detailing that out of forty-three countries whose ships
were attacked in 2008, ships flying under the flags of these six countries accounted
for almost fifty percent of attacked ships).
149. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at ¶ 6 (recognizing the efforts of these
countries to provide security to the coast of Somalia).
150. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that Somali pirates are
responsible for the increased attacks in the Gulf of Aden).
151. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the ways a nation can establish
jurisdiction under the SUA Convention).
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C. AMERICAN PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES CAN LEGALLY
PROVIDE ARMED GUARDS TO THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY
Private security companies must abide by the laws of all territorial
seas through which they travel.152 In addition, these companies must
always comply with the laws of the vessel’s flag state.153 Therefore,
even if a ship’s flag state allows for armed guards, vessels will
encounter problems when navigating through numerous territorial
seas.154 For example, problems will potentially arise when a ship
travels through territorial seas that do not allow armed guards or
which have stringent gun control laws. Ships are not capable of
easily removing prohibited weapons when travelling by sea.
American private security companies sailing under the American
flag are allowed to have armed guards aboard vessels.155 In addition,
these companies will not run into legal problems in Somalia’s
territorial seas because there is no functioning government in
Somalia.156 As long as the companies are in compliance with the laws
of every other territorial sea through which they travel to reach the
Gulf of Aden, it is legal for private security companies to provide
armed guards.157

152. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 2 (establishing the coastal state’s
jurisdiction over its territorial seas); see also Liss, supra note 85, at 6 (recognizing
that “reputable” companies always have to abide by the laws of the countries they
are operating in).
153. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 92 (determining that ships shall sail under
only one state flag and that this state retains exclusive jurisdiction over the ship
when it is on the high seas).
154. See Liss, supra note 85, at 7 (citing that employees of Background Asia, a
private security company, are required to “disassemble their weapons and lock the
ammunition magazines and firing pins in separate locations” when traveling
through Singapore waters). The author also reports that Malaysia and Indonesia do
not allow armed escorts, and that Malaysian authorities have warned that any
armed escorts found in Malaysian waters would be detained, and the crew arrested.
Id.
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (affirming an individual’s right to bear arms).
156. See supra note 28; see also Houreld, supra note 84, at 1 (reporting that
Somali government officials also approve of the use of private companies).
157. See Press Release, HollowPoint Protection Services, supra note 82, at 1
(quoting the CEO as saying, “[y]es, we have established which countries allow
private armed agents on their vessels”).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
To address the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the
Gulf of Aden, the United Nations (“U.N.”) should update the
UNCLOS piracy definition and create a new international court with
exclusive jurisdiction to only prosecute pirates. Somali pirates are
rarely captured and they have no fear of prosecution.158 Current
worldwide cooperation to provide increased security to the area is
necessary, but the area is too large for the naval ships to prevent all
attacks.159 Private security companies can provide a useful role in
filling in gaps to protect ships, but the international community
should not allow these companies to provide armed guards aboard
vessels.160

A. THE U.N. SHOULD REMOVE THE HIGH SEAS REQUIREMENT
UNDER THE UNCLOS DEFINITION OF PIRACY AND REMOVE THE
JURISDICTION RESTRICTION THAT COUNTRIES SEIZE PIRATES ON
THE HIGH SEAS FOR FAILED STATES
States like Somalia, without a functioning government, can
become breeding zones for piracy.161 Yet, international law under the
UNCLOS does not cover the piratical acts off these coastal states
because of the requirement that the act take place on the high seas.162
As a solution, the U.N. should amend the UNCLOS piracy definition

158. See Katharine Houreld & Mike Corder, Few Nations Willing to Prosecute
Pirates, DENVER POST, Apr. 18, 2009, available at http://www.denverpost.com/na
tionworld/ci_12169011 (concluding that many pirates are set free because of the
“many pitfalls along the path to prosecution”). But see Devlin Barrett, Source:
Captured Somali Pirate to Face Trial in NY, BREITBART, Apr. 16, 2009, available
at
http://www/breitbart.com/article.phhp?id=D97J
S0T01&show_article=1
(reporting that a Somali pirate who held a U.S. captain hostage will be sent to New
York for prosecution).
159. See Anita Powell, Ships Have Few Options Against Somali Pirates, ABC
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go .com/International/WireStory
?id=7304362&page=1 (recognizing that it would take sixty-one ships to control
even a fraction of where pirates have operated).
160. See Liss, supra note 85, at 3 (listing services offered by security
companies, such as risk assessment and crew member training).
161. See Stiles, supra note 29, at 301 (acknowledging the difficulty in
controlling the coast of Somalia because of anarchy and corruption).
162. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a)(i) (limiting the definition of piracy
to acts committed on the high seas).
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to include areas other than the high seas.163 Historically, the high seas
were perhaps one of the riskiest places for piracy, but modern day
pirates now operate much more often in territorial seas of nonfunctioning states.164 Some Somali pirates do not fall under the
UNCLOS because they do not operate in the high seas.165 Somalia
has no government capable of capturing and prosecuting pirates
under Somali law; therefore international law should be expanded to
address this shortfall.166 Since the UNCLOS is generally-accepted
customary international law, and the Somali pirates meet the other
UNCLOS requirements, removing the high seas requirement places
the pirates squarely within the UNCLOS and provides a modern
piracy definition for the international community.167
For failed states, the U.N. should also remove the requirement that
countries seize pirates on the high seas.168 There is no official
definition of a failed state, but most definitions include the inability
of the government to control the territory, lack of stability for the
citizens, no economic growth, and much violence.169 Countries
should be able to pursue and capture pirates within these failed
states’ territorial seas. The U.N. Security Council essentially waived

163. See discussion supra Part II.A (analyzing the drawbacks of the high seas
restriction).
164. See DUBNER, supra note 9, at 160 (arguing that territorial seas are targeted
by pirates in coastal states where the pirates know there is no adequate security or
law enforcement); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (adopting a different
definition of piracy because the UNCLOS does not address pirate attacks that take
place in states’ sovereign territories).
165. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (analyzing the drawbacks of the high seas
restriction).
166. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at 1 (noting Somalia’s inability to
handle the increase in piracy).
167. See discussion supra Part II.A. (arguing that the high seas requirement
forbids the Somali pirates’ attacks from being piracy under the UNCLOS).
168. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (allowing states to only capture
pirates on the high seas, outside the territorial seas of any other state).
169. Rosa Ehrenrich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2005); see also Foreign Policy, Failed States Index 2009
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states
_index_faq_methodology (listing the following factors used to determine a failed
state: “Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight,
Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public
Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External
Intervention”).
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the high seas jurisdiction restriction when it passed Resolution
1846.170 This Resolution was a good first step in recognizing how
pirates take advantage of failed states by operating in, or retreating to
these states’ territorial seas.171 However, the resolution was only
temporary.172 Thus, for failed states, the U.N. should permanently
remove from the UNCLOS the jurisdiction restriction that countries
capture pirates on the high seas.173

B. THE U.N. SHOULD CREATE A NEW INTERNATIONAL COURT
WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO ONLY PROSECUTE PIRATES
To date, most countries have been unwilling to prosecute
pirates.174 The use of bilateral agreements between certain countries
will not encompass all captured pirates, only those pirates captured
by countries who have entered into such agreements.175 Bilateral
agreements between two countries are not an ideal way to deal with
piracy because piracy affects the entire international community, not
just ship owners, crew members, and governments of the ships
attacked.176 Therefore, the U.N. should create a new international

170. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at ¶ 10 (authorizing states to enter
Somalia’s territorial seas and use all necessary means to repress piracy).
171. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (detailing how the Somali pirates
anchor hijacked ships in Somalia’s territorial seas).
172. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at ¶ 10 (declaring that the resolution will
expire in December 2009).
173. See id. at 1 (recalling all previous U.N. Security Resolutions passed that
relate to piracy off the coast of Somalia and noting that S.C. Res. 1846 went into
force on the day S.C. Res. 1816 expired). Security Council Resolution 1816 was
the precursor to Resolution 1846, declaring that states can enter Somalia’s
territorial waters to stop piracy. See S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816
(June 2, 2008).
174. See Meade, supra note 37 (hypothesizing that a deal between the United
States and Kenya is a significant move towards creating a process to prosecute
pirates). But see Alasdair Sandford, Somali Pirates Face Prosecution in France,
Apr. 16, 2008, BBC NEWS, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/
learningenglish/newsenglish/witn/2008/04/080416_somali_pirates.shtml (reporting
that the French were going to prosecute Somali pirates who held a French yacht
hostage “in what would be the first trial of its kind”).
175. See Meade, supra note 37 (outlining a proposed deal where Kenya will
only prosecute pirates caught by the United States).
176. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 1 (hypothesizing that the costs of piracy
increase the cost of manufactured goods and oil and that piracy has the potential to
cause a major environmental disaster).
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court specifically designed to prosecute captured pirates.177 The
UNCLOS defines piracy, but it relies on states and their national
laws to actually prosecute pirates.178 A new international court with
exclusive jurisdiction over pirates would take this pressure off
national governments.179
In addition, this court could evaluate issues such as whether piracy
did occur and the appropriate penalties to be imposed.180 Once the
UNCLOS definition of piracy is updated, the new court will then
have a modern standard to apply to the pirates’ acts.181 Furthermore,
this international court could also determine its own penalties for the
punishment of pirates, thus providing one standard for the entire
international community.182 Currently, different countries have a
wide range of penalties for pirates, and it is inequitable for pirates to
receive a harsher or more lenient sentence just because a certain
country captures them.183
Inherent in this recommendation is the idea that states will have to
voluntarily submit to jurisdiction by another body.184 In order to get
as many countries as possible to submit to the jurisdiction of the new
177. See Joshua Michael Goodwin, Note, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate:
Time for an Old Couple to Part, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973, 1008-09 (2006)
(insisting that the creation of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)
demonstrates that states are willing to work together to combat international
crime); see also DUBNER, supra note 9, at 161 (proposing asserting jurisdiction
over pirates in a specific “dispute settlement mechanism”).
178. See Michael H. Passman, Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates Under
the Law of War and International Law, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 10 (2008) (explaining
that pirates are unique because they are not tried in an international court under
international law when they are caught outside the jurisdiction of any state).
179. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (allowing for the courts of the state
that seized the pirates to decide on the proper penalties).
180. See DUBNER, supra note 9, at 162 (purporting that having an international
tribunal to specifically deal with pirates might also lead to more prosecutions
because some states might currently be reluctant to punish pirates for fear of
retaliation by terrorist groups).
181. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing for a change in the current
definition of piracy under the UNCLOS).
182. See Goodwin, supra note 174, at 1008 (pointing out that because all nations
have different laws, pirates can receive a sentence of anywhere from three years to
life in prison depending on which country is prosecuting them).
183. Id.
184. See DUBNER, supra note 9, at 161-62 (proposing that the jurisdiction of the
international court should include the ability to impose penalties and grant political
asylum).
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international court, this court should only have the power to
prosecute crimes relating to piracy.185 It is more likely that states
will submit to the jurisdiction of a court that deals with one
specifically-defined crime.186

C. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT ALLOW
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES TO PUT ARMED GUARDS ON
VESSELS
Arming vessels creates a potential situation of escalated costs and
violence.187 Innocent crew members are more likely to suffer the
negative consequences of having armed guards on vessels. The
pirates claim to have no desire to hurt the crew members but they do
fire assault rifles “indiscriminately” during attacks.188 Violence could
quickly escalate and produce deadly consequences if an armed guard
began firing back.189 The crew members are currently safer being
taken hostage rather than being caught in the middle of a gun
battle.190 Some argue that the uncertainty of not knowing whether a
vessel is armed creates a beneficial deterrent effect.191 However,
ships can utilize plenty of other defense mechanisms to deter pirates
that do not threaten the lives of the crew members.192

185. Cf. Goodwin, supra note 174, at 1008–09 (disagreeing with the creation of
a new tribunal).
186. Cf. id. (pointing out that not all countries have submitted to jurisdiction of
the ICC).
187. See EKLÖF, supra note 43, at 129 (concluding that many times the costs to
the ship owner of hiring a private security company are high compared to the cost
and risk of piracy); see also IMO Guidelines, supra note 88, at ¶ 60 (arguing that
having firearms on board would just encourage pirates to carry firearms).
188. See Houreld, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining the manager of IMB’s
understanding of how pirates operate).
189. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 135 (noting the
incremental nature of piracy-related violence).
190. See supra Introduction (noting that pirates are operating for ransom money
and in general do not want to hurt the crew); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3,
at 27-30 (providing numerous examples of crew members being returned after a
ransom was paid).
191. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 135 (quoting Capt.
Philip Cheek as saying, “suspicion alone, that a vessel is carrying among her crew,
half a dozen trained killers would have a snowball effect”). “It would probably
only need one surprise shoot-out, . . . killing every boarder, to send out the right
message.” Id.
192. See Houreld, supra note 84, at 3 (listing a range of “[h]igh-tech but non-

FIRST AUTHOR CHECK (DO NOT DELETE)

312

2/15/2010 2:13 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:283

It has been suggested that the U.N. could facilitate putting
professionally-trained armed guards aboard ships.193 Yet, it is highly
unlikely that all countries could reach an agreement because not
every country directly benefits from maritime commerce.194
Ultimately, the dangers to the crew members outweigh the potential
deterrent effect of putting armed guards on vessels and companies
like Blackwater Worldwide and HollowPoint Services should not
provide armed guards to the shipping industry. Furthermore, private
security companies do nothing to help address the underlying
problems of piracy or aid in the effective prosecution of pirates.195

CONCLUSION
Current international conventions do not provide a proper legal
regime to adequately define and prosecute Somali pirates. In order to
effectively address the increase in pirate attacks, the U.N. should
remove the high seas requirement from the UNCLOS piracy
definition, and the jurisdiction restrictions for failed states. In
addition, the U.N. should create a new international court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to only prosecute pirates. American private
security companies can legally put armed guards aboard American
ships, but they must abide by the laws of every territorial sea through
which they travel. However, armed guards unnecessarily increase the
risks to crew members and the international community should not
allow them on vessels as a solution to the increase in piracy attacks.

lethal weapons” including dazzle guns and microwave guns).
193. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 137 (commending the
idea if it could actually be accomplished).
194. See id. (hypothesizing that the states that do not directly benefit from
maritime commerce would not agree to pay for or provide support for arming
vessels).
195. See Liss, supra note 85, at 12 (acknowledging that private security
companies may have some benefits to preventing individual attacks, but that they
do nothing to “address the underlying root causes of modern day piracy itself.”).

